Torts by Sloan, Frank K.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 8 Issue 1 Article 24 
Fall 1955 
Torts 
Frank K. Sloan 
South Carolina 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frank K. Sloan, Torts, 8 S.C.L.R. 135. (1955). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
TORTS
FRANK K. SLOAN*
While the Supreme Court handled the usual crop of automobile
negligence cases in the year, seven cases involving fraud and deceit
dominated the decisions in the field of torts. Apparently the decisions
contained no novel holdings, but some emphasis was added to the
previously-announced rule that an action may be based upon a fraudu-
lent promise to perform a future act.
For convenience this section is divided into fraud cases, negligence
cases, and miscellaneous tort decisions.
Fraud
Generally fraud must relate to a present or pre-existing fact, and
cannot ordinarily be predicated on unfulfilled promises or statements
as to future events. The Supreme Court in two decisions this year,
Weatherford v. Home Finance Co.1 and Thomas & Howard Co. v.
Fowler,2 has reaffirmed the "exception or limitation to the effect that
fraud may be based on promises made with an intention not to per-
form the same", first stated by Justice Cothran in Palmetto Bank &
Trust Co. v. Grimsley.3
In both decisions the court was faced with the inevitable clash with
the parol evidence rule which arises when a party asserts promises
were made but not reduced to writing. In Thomas & Howard the
circuit court held the alleged promises tended to vary the terms of
the mortgage and could not therefore form the basis for fraud, but
the Supreme Court reversed. In Weatherford the court held that
the question whether plaintiff, who could not read, was overreached
by defendant in drawing the contract not in accordance with the
promises was properly submitted to the jury. In Palmetto Bank
Justice Cothran had said, "if these promises were made to induce
the execution of the mortgage, with the concealed purpose to dis-
regard them, the 'Parol Evidence Rule' cuts no figure." Many juris-
dictions have found it wiser to adhere strictly to the parol evidence
rule,4 perhaps because it is easier and more certain; but this exception
LL.B., University of South Carolina, 1948. Member of American, South Carolina and
Richland County Bar Associations.
1. 225 S.C. 313, 82 S.E. 2d 196 (1954).
2. 225 S.C. 354, 82 S.E. 2d 454 (1954).
3. 134 S.C. 493, 133 S.E. 437, 51 A.L.R. 42 (1926).
4. 125 A.L.R. 879; Page v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 192 S.C. 59, 5 S.E. 2d 454
(1939).
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is firmly established here, and makes another factual question for the
jury.
In another fraud case, Tallevast v. Herzog,5 the court restated the
rule of I. B. Colt Co. v. Britt,6 that whether a party had the right in
the circumstances to rely upon representations made by another is
a question of fact for the jury if there is evidence of fraud.
Arnold v. Life Insurance Co. of Georgia7 was probably the most
unusual of the fraud cases. The insurer was held not liable on the
policy because the insured had falsely stated in her application that
she had not been a patient in a hospital or sanitarium, when she had
in fact been a patient in the State Hospital. The court did not find
it necessary, therefore, to pass on the contention that the policy was
void from its inception by reason of the fact that it had been procured
by her husband with the intent to murder her later- which he did
do. The court did hold however that the insured could not escape the
consequence of her fraud on the ground that she was a minor. The
simple reason is that the minor's option is to affirm or disaffirm his
contract in toto, and he cannot disaffirm one part and seek to enforce
the remainder.8
Only Gause v. Jones9 of the remaining cases involving fraud is of
note. There the court held that a counterclaim for libel is a valid
defense to an action for fraud under Section 10-705 of the Code, 10
where the counterclaim was based upon a denial of the fraudulent
act alleged by the complaint.
Negligence
While the court again denied the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
applies in this State in Hicklin v. Jeff Hunt Machinery Co.,"1 that
doctrine becomes progressively more difficult to distinguish from the
rule which the court now frankly denominates "our rule of circum-
stantial evidence," in Turner v. Wilson.' 2 The rule was also applied
during the past year in Browder v. Southern Railway.'3
The Browder case occasions little comment, as it was another case
of the intoxicated licensee who uses a railway roadbed for his last
earthly resting place; and it is a legitimate heir of Woodward v.
5. 225 S.C. 563, 83 S.E. 2d 204 (1954).
6. 129 S.C. 226, 123 S.E. 845 (1924).
7. 226 S.C. 60, 83 S.E. 2d 553 (1954).
8. Dickert v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 176 S.C. 476, 180 S.E. 462 (1935).
9. 85 S.E. 2d 402 (S.C. 1955).
10. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROrINA, 1952 § 10-705.
11. 85 S.E. 2d 739 (S. C. 1955).
12. 86 S.E. 2d 867 (S.C. 1955).
13. 226 S.C. 26, 83 S.E. 2d 455 (1954).
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Southern Railway.14 However, in the Hicklin case actionable negli-
gence was found from the conclusion that a sheave (which killed
plaintiff's intestate) could not have come loose from a bulldozer un-
less defendant was negligent in some manner in inspecting or secur-
ing same. In the Turner case, the evidence was styled "wholly
circumstantial" by the court when plaintiff became ill after eating
and the circumstances pointed to a deviled egg sandwich made by
defendant. Of course the latter was a Pure Food Act' 5 case, and
the violation makes out a prima facie case; but the reader of these
decisions will be hard put to distinguish our rule of circumstantial
evidence from the classic definitions of res ipsa loquitur.
16
Damages -In Hall v. Walters17 the court found no difficulty in
upholding a verdict for $1,000 actual, and $25,000 punitive damages
in an assault and battery action against a labor union, an unincorpo-
rated association of some 1,600 members; observing that "on a per
capita basis the burden of payment will not be heavy." The court's
comments and cases cited indicate clearly that it will not depart from
its now firmly established rule that it will not disturb verdicts unless
there is a real showing of prejudice, passion, or improper motive.
Mere argument that a verdict is too large does not meet the require-
ment. It must be so excessive as to "shock the conscience" of the
court.
In Joiner v. Fort'8 the court restated its holding in Jeffords v.
Florence County19 that payment of hospital and medical expenses
by insurance or receipt of benefits under accident policies does not
affect or lessen the amount recoverable from the party responsible
for the injury.
Fourth Circuit Judge Soper commented upon the "unique practice"
of South Carolina courts in permitting the jury to apportion damages
among joint tort-feasors in Atlantic Coast Line v. Robertson;2 0 an
interesting case in which the court upheld the validity of an agree-
14. 90 S.C. 262, 73 S.E. 79 (1911).
15. CoDm OF LAWS OF SoUTH CAROLINA, 1952 §§ 32-1511 et seq.
16. Cf. Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 33 S.Ct. 416, 57 L.Ed. 815, Ann.
Cas. 1914 D 905 (1913), perhaps the leading American Decision: In the ab-
sence of any explanation, negligence may fairly be inferred "where the circum-
stances of the occurrence that has caused the injury are of a character to give
ground for a reasonable inference that if due care had been employed by the
party charged with care in the premises, the thing that happened amiss would
not have happened." See also 38 Am. Jur. 989, Neg. § 295.
17. 85 S.E. 2d 729 (S.C. 1955).
18. 226 S.C. 249, 84 S.E. 2d 719 (1954).
19. 165 S.C. 15, 162 S.E. 574, 81 A.L.R. 313 (1932).
20. 214 F. 2d 746 (1954).
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ment by one tort-feasor to indemnify the other for loss due to negli-
gence.
Invitees - In Joiner v. Fort2 ' and Richards v. A. & p.22 the
court again confirmed the right of invitees to have a safe passage
provided for them. In the Joiner case a heating contractor was
held liable after leaving a vent open in the church floor and plaintiff
injured herself stepping into the opening. The court stated that the
contractor could reasonably expect the church to be visited during
week days as well as Sunday. In the Richards case leaving boxes in
the aisle over which plaintiff fell backward made a jury question on
negligence. If such hazards are to be left, the invitee must be warned
of their presence.
Liability of Electrical Cooperatives- Our Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit concurred in a finding, in
separate cases,23 that electrical cooperatives are neither municipal
corporations nor charitable corporations under the laws of this State,
and are liable for damages for their torts as are other public service
corporations.
Miscellaneous Decisions
Act of God-In Belue v. City of Greenville2 4 the city failed in
its reliance upon the defense that damage from a rainstorm was an
"act of God," because the city had made changes in the curbs and
gutters altering the natural flow of water. The court pointed out
that under the settled cases in this State an act of God must be the
sole cause of the injury to avail as a defense.
Attachment- The court seems to have cleared away many doubts
about the rights of parties in attachment actions in Trawick v. One
1952 International Pickup,2 5 an unusually succinct opinion. It may
be summarized as follows: (1) Party damaged in an automobile
accident may proceed in ren, in personam, or both. (2) The ve-
hicle's owner, if not made a party, may intervene and set up his
rights to the vehicle. (3) The right to intervene is, however, dis-
cretionary with the court. (4) The plaintiff has the right to choose
how he will proceed and cannot be compelled to allege a cause of
action against the intervening owner. (5) The intervention is to
21. 226 S.C. 249, 84 S.E. 2d 719 (1954).
22. 226 S.C. 119, 83 S.E. 2d 917 (1954).
23. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electrical Coop., 215 F. 2d 542 (1954). Bush v.
Aiken Electric Coop., 85 S.E. 2d 716 (S.C. 1955).
24. 226 S.C. 192,84 S.E. 2d 631 (1954).
25. 85 S.E. 2d 729 (S.C. 1955).
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protect the interest of the intervenor and does not alter the right of
the plaintiff to complete his action in rent in the county of attach-
ment nor permit the intervenor to change the venue.
Conspiracy- In Hall v. Walters2 6 an action based upon a con-
spiracy to prevent plaintiff (and other non-union employees) from
working in a mill, alleging that the conspiracy was consummated by
assault and battery, the court adopted the majority rule from other
jurisdictions that an unincorporated union and some or all of its
members may be joined as conspirators to support the action.
Duress-Little progress was made by one of the litigants in
Thomas & Howard v. Fowler2 7 in relying upon a claim of duress.
Mortgagee brought claim and delivery and the mortgagor defended
(among other grounds) upon the ground that the mortgage had been
obtained by duress, in that the mortgagee's agent was alleged to
have said he "would go to Spartanburg and have them closed up"
and that they signed the mortgage rather than be forced out of busi-
ness. The court said this "was nothing more than a threat that
unless secured, plaintiff would resort to legal proceedings to collect
its account. This does not constitute duress."
The other decisions in the field of Torts in the past year were
routine automobile damage suits; but the attorney who has an auto-
mobile suit involving minor passengers will find profitable reading
in Bolt v. Gibson.28 In an opinion by Circuit Judge J. Frank Eat-
mon, acting associate justice, the court seems almost to have ruled
out contributory negligence for minor passengers under 14, for both
the reason that they are presumed not to know how to drive a car
under license statutes,2 9 and they cannot under the "common sense"
view have joint or equal control over the vehicle with parent or adult.
26. 225 S.C. 321, 82 S.E. 2d 275 (1954).
27. 225 S.C. 354, 82 S.E. 2d 454 (1954).
28. 225 S.C. 538, 83 S.E. 2d 191 (1954).
29. CODE OF LAWS OP SOUTH CAROLINA, 1952 § 46-181.
5
Sloan: Torts
Published by Scholar Commons,
